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Abstract
This study develops a method to evaluate the quality of a legal framework for bank
regulation and supervision (RS) by developing an extensive set of criteria and a coding
system. Using this method, we generate an original set of measurements for RS by evaluating
the letter of banking laws of 23 transition economies.  In doing so, we also utilize the Basle
guidelines on banking supervision and the related literature.  The indices of RS indicate that
legal banking reforms in Poland, Hungary and Estonia have been more ambitious than the rest
of the countries in transition.  In general, however, banking laws in transition economies
indicate a lower regulatory and supervisory quality than indicated by the German banking
law, if one is willing to choose the latter as a benchmark.
This data set permits an empirical analysis of the relationship between legal RS and
macroeconomic performance.  The empirical evidence in the paper shows a significant
positive relationship between RS and real GDP growth in transition economies.
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I. Introduction
Financial sector development is closely associated with bank performance given that a
major part of the financial sector is still accounted for by banks in a large part of the world.
Banks play an essential role in resource allocation so long as depositors have confidence in
the banking system's ability to pay the contracted return.  Efficient transmission of resources
by banks, however, can be threatened by adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
Legal and institutional arrangements that force efficiency in resource allocation
contributes to the soundness of the banking sector via reducing both the likelihood and the
cost of such problems.  Appropriately designed legal regulatory and supervisory frameworks
and deposit insurance schemes constitute an essential part of such arrangements for a sound
banking sector.
Achieving a sound banking system via good regulation and supervision is not an end
in itself for it also contributes to macroeconomic growth via improving efficiency in resource
allocation.
1  This paper's contribution is twofold.  First, it develops a general framework to
evaluate the legal environment for regulation and supervision of the banking sector.  In doing
that, it proposes an extensive list of criteria (a total of 98 criteria) to measure the quality of
bank regulation and supervision (RS) based on banking laws.  Second, using these criteria we
construct indices of RS to empirically investigate the linkage between the legal framework for
bank regulation and supervision, we empirically investigate the linkage between bank
regulation and supervision quality and growth in transition economies.
Banking laws lay out regulations with regards to bank ownership, management, asset
structure, operations and reporting-recording requirements, besides other issues.  We argue
that the more rule-based the legal regulatory framework, the more transparent, and thus easy
                                                
1 Levine (1997) provides an excellent review of the literature and discussion on the relationship
between financial market development and growth.3
to monitor, are the bank operations.  This helps to reduce the adverse selection and moral
hazard problems in the banking sector.
2  It is important to note, however, that the quality of
regulation does not necessarily mean strictness of regulation.  Rather, the quality means the
extent of coverage of the regulatory framework, along with appropriate safeguards against the
risks in the banking sector.
Good supervision reduces the likelihood and the extent of excessive risk taking by
banks.  As a vehicle to ensure effective implementation of the regulatory practices,
supervision of the banking system is therefore as important for the health of the banking
sector as regulation.  In addition, a -- carefully designed-- deposit insurance scheme helps to
improve the quality of both regulation and supervision by mitigating the likelihood of the
moral hazard problem in the banking sector.
While these are all pertinent issues, measuring the quality of banking regulation and
supervision is not a simple task.  To perform this task as objectively as possible, we thus use
various sources to develop a comprehensive set of measurement criteria.  Among these
sources, we primarily utilise the Basle Core Principles (BCP, henceforth)
3, other Basle
guidelines and documents, and the banking laws of individual countries.  In addition, we
utilise the recent literature on financial sector stability, most notably, Goodhart (1995),
Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998), Caprio (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
(1999), that provide insights into various issues of importance for prudent bank regulation,
supervision and deposit insurance.
                                                
2 Based on Camelot rankings of bank regulation and regulatory environment, Caprio (1998) argues for
the positive linkage between the laxity of regulatory framework for the financial sector and the extent
of banking crises in 1997 for 12 Asian and Latin American countries.  (Camelot rankings are based on
capital, asset quality, management, earnings (which is not employed by Caprio [1988]) and liquidity)
3 BCP have been outlined in 1997 by the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision as the guiding
principles of banking regulation.  The principles are initially composed of those pertaining to
licencing, structural refroms, regulation and supervision, information criteria and overseas banking.4
The list of criteria we thus propose covers eight main categories of information that
appear in a standard fashion in banking laws: A) capital requirements; B) lending; C)
ownership structure; D) directors and managers; E) reporting/recording requirements; F)
corrective action; G) supervision and; H) deposit insurance.  Each of these categories is
composed of several subcategories so as to take into account as much information provided in
banking laws as possible.  For each such subcategory, we then develop a codification system
that quantifies the information that are mostly of a qualitative nature (see Appendix 1).
Utilising this quantification procedure, we then obtain aggregate measurements of the
quality of bank regulation and supervision.  To do this, we follow two main procedures: 1.
We first take simple (unweighted) averages of the set of criteria composing each of the eight
categories and then take the simple averages of the resulting eight main numbers. 2. We
employ a principle components analysis, which reduces the number of variables from 98 to
only a few.  The indexes of RS obtained through the first procedure also permit a systematic
documentation of the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision across countries.
 4
Next, we empirically analyze the relationship between the legal quality of RS and
growth.  The current study focuses on transition economies that have all adopted new banking
laws as part of their wide-ranging economic reforms since the end of the 1980s.  These
countries have, however, recently undergone many other institutional changes that may have
also affected their growth performances.  Hence, to single out the impact of the quality of RS
on growth, we also control for the degree of liberalization, measured by de Melo et al (1996),
                                                                                                                                                        
4 To our knowledge, the only other study of a similar nature is that by Cleassens (1997), who, on the
basis of a questionnaire containing 16 questions, develops an index of bank regulation and supervision
for 25 transition countries.  That index is based on the respondents' perception of the quality of bank
regulation and supervision.  The author then uses that index to analyse its relation with various types
of banking reform strategies, concluding that decentralized institution-building and penalising weak
banks are important for reform.5
the rule of law
5, and initial level of per capita GDP.   The empirical analysis provides
suggestive evidence for the significant positive relationship between the quality of bank
regulation and supervision and growth.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section II presents the method to
measure the quality of banking regulation and supervision.  An application of this framework
to transition economies is reported in section III, where we report the results of the panel data
analysis of the relationship between RS and the rate of growth.  Concluding remarks are
provided in Section IV.
II.  Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision
While banks act with the profit motive and may therefore be willing to take risks, their
operations may not always be in the interest of the banking system or of the society as a
whole.  In addition, there are various sources of uncertainty in the financial system due not
only to the domestic but also increasingly the global financial and economic factors.  Bank
regulation and supervision (RS) is therefore of great importance in achieving a stable banking
system as part of the overall economic stability.  Good regulation and supervision does not
only ensure depositor safety, through various channels such as transparency in bank
operations via reporting and recording requirements, but also banks' own safety, through
prudent lending and capital controls.  A healthy banking system also requires bank
management and operations to be subject to prudent regulations and careful monitoring.
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
6 has outlined Core Principles (BCP) in
1997 as a basic reference for authorities to implement bank supervision effectively.  Among
                                                
5 Measured by the "Corruption Perception Index" provided by Transparency International.6
these principles are those pertaining to licensing, methods of regulation and supervision,
information requirements and cross-border banking.  Nevertheless, BCP guidelines do not
provide the detail and the extent of the coverage of most of the criteria we propose in this
paper.  Rather, it provides general guidelines for improving bank regulation and supervision.
In addition to the BCP, we utilize the main elements of a successful deposit insurance
(DI) scheme reported by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) based on a cross-sectional
study of banking system stability.  We view that a successfully designed DI complements the
quality and effectiveness of bank regulation and supervision.
Our method to evaluate the quality of RS is primarily based on the examination of the
letter of banking laws, in view of both the BCP guidelines and the related literature.  In doing
this, we develop a comprehensive list of criteria by initially grouping the type of information
that can be obtained from banking laws under eight main categories: A) capital requirements;
B) lending; C) ownership structure; D) directors and managers; E) reporting/recording
requirements; F) corrective action; G) supervision and; H) deposit insurance.
Who performs the function of the regulatory and supervisory agent has attracted a
measure of attention in the literature (see, for example, Goodhart [1995]).  It is argued, on the
one hand, that the central bank should be involved in regulation as the lender of last resort.
As an agent that should primarily care about price stability, however, the central bank is not
the most appropriate agent to perform this function.  The role of the government in bank
regulation, on the other hand, should also be limited in order to minimize political
involvement in bank activities and rescue operations.  Since this debate is unresolved in the
literature, we refrain from an attempt to form a criterion regarding this aspect of RS.
A detailed inspection of banking laws leads us to develop a total of 98 criteria that
appear relevant for measuring the quality of RS that we all coded from the letter of individual
                                                                                                                                                        
6 A committee of banking supervisors that works on strengthening financial stability throughout the7
banking laws
7.  The following is an outline of the various criteria considered under each of
the above eight categories, as well as the rationale for considering them:  A)  Capital
requirements: minimum capital requirement at licensing; limitations on holding risky assets
and; restrictions on capital acquisitions all intend to fulfil the purpose of limiting excessive
risk taking by banks.
8   B)  Lending: Establishing and fulfilling credit standards are of utmost
importance for the health of the banking system.  Hence, limitations on price, interest and
exchange rate risk in lending; existence of background checks for the borrowers; limitations
on the amount of lending either to a single borrower (related party, employee, manager or
otherwise) or on the aggregate; decision taking for lending to big borrowers and managers
and; limits on lending to the government all provide important information to measure RS.
Detailed information on each of the above helps identify and monitor the credit risk in the
banking system.  C)  Ownership structure: information on the financial standing of
shareholders; limitations on shareholding and; transfer of shareholders are all geared to attain,
and maintain, prudent financial standards in the banking system.  D)  Directors and
managers: qualification restrictions on bank directors and managers intend to measure the
competence, trustworthiness and accountability of bank administration, which are all
important for prudence in bank activities.  E)  Reporting-recording requirements:
information on operating plan; systems of control and internal organisation; time-coverage of
financial projections; the extent of detail on on-site supervision and; the coverage and
frequency of reporting requirements all allow for close monitoring of banks' performance.
Besides, they all help to establish prudent business practices and to prevent fraud, banks'
imprudent behaviour and excessive risk taking.  F)  Corrective action:  in cases of ineffective
                                                                                                                                                        
world.
7 The banking laws were obtained mostly by mail request from individual countries' central banks,
from the internet site www.GBLD.org, or the web-sites of central banks.8
regulation that results in the accumulation of bad loans, illiquidity or insolvency of a bank,
supervisory agent may intervene in different ways, such as assigning a conservator or a
liquidation trustee, providing credit, removal of the licence, imposing penalties or restricting
bank activities.  The detail of information that identifies the cases leading to such corrective
action gives a measure of transparency and efficiency in the banking system.  G)  Supervision:
the extent of information both provided in supervisory reports
9 and with respect to rights and
duties of the supervisor help to measure the effectiveness with which the implementation of
regulatory standards are monitored.  H)  Deposit insurance (DI): the list of "desirable
features" of a DI scheme draws upon the study by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999).
The rationale for including DI in the measurement of RS is that, when incorrectly designed,
DI leads to the problem of moral hazard and that leads banks to become willing to undertake
riskier projects than otherwise.  Hence, unless appropriately designed, deposit insurance
schemes may challenge the effectiveness of regulatory and supervisory practices.
In Appendix 1, we report the list of criteria outlined above, as well as their
codification method to obtain an index measure of the quality of RS.  The codification method
ranks the information from 1 to 0, where 1 indicates the best quality.
10
Using these codes, we then obtain aggregate measures of RS by means of two
procedures.  1.We first take an unweighted average of the codes under each of the eight
categories, leading to eight indices for each of the main categories labelled as A to H above.
                                                                                                                                                        
8 BCBS reports in "Capital requirements and bank behaviour" (1999) the positive real effects of a
successful implementation of these principles.
9 For this part, we particularly utilised the recent Basle report (Core Principles Methodology, October
1999) in ascertaining the extent of detail that should be provided in banking laws for effective
supervision.  In the same report, information regarding corporate governance of banks are detailed,
although we observe that current banking laws of transition economies have not handled this issue
with the same emphasis.9
We then take another unweighted average of the eight indices, resulting in an aggregate
index of RS, which we call RSu.  2. As alternative to the unweighted averaging method, we
apply a principle component analysis
11 in two different ways.  a) Firstly, we obtain principle
components derived from the entire set of ninety-eight codes, regardless of the eight main
categories described above that each of those criteria are grouped into.  The resulting number
of principle components is four; we label them as PCa1 PCa2 PCa3 and PCa4.  b) Secondly,
we obtain principle components initially for each of the eight categories, and then subject the
resulting 17 principle components (as the number of principle components for each of the
eight main categories varies)
12 to a second round of analysis that produces three principle
components, which we label: PCb1 PCb2 and PCb3.  Tables A2.a and A2.b of the Appendix
report the principle components of both type PCa and PCb.
Table 1 provides a ranking of countries with respect to RSu.   According to this table,
the current banking laws of Poland, Hungary and Estonia indicate the highest quality of RS in
the list of transition economies, while the former banking law of Armenia and Latvia, and the
current banking law of Moldovia rank the lowest in the list.  Due to lack of data for post 1997
period, however, current banking law of Poland is not included in the empirical analysis.
As a point of reference, we also looked at the most recent banking law of Germany, as
a country that should closely reflect the Basle Core Principles.  The coding of RSu for
Germany is: 0.54, which is larger than all the countries' RSu in our list, with the exception of
the 3
rd Polish banking law.
                                                                                                                                                        
10 We arrive at these normalized codes by rescaling the codes in Appendix I between zero and one,
such that code 1 under any criterion in Appendix I remains to be 1, and the highest number under each
criterion is rescaled to 0, with other codes in between are rescaled accordingly.
11 Principle component analysis is used to represent information contained in 98 variables that measure
RS by means of such few combinations of those 98 variables that are constructed to account for the
highest variation among the ninety-eight  (see, for example, Greene, pp. 271-73).10
Table 1: Ranking of country - banking laws with respect to RSu.
Country Year of Enactment RSu
of the Banking Law




Kazakhstan (2) 1995 0.33
Macedonia 1994 0.30
Czheck Republic 1992 0.26
Slovak Republic 1992 0.26
Croatia (2) 1996 0.26
Armenia (2) 1996 0.26
Croatia 1993 0.25
Bulgaria 1992 0.25
Azerbaijan (2) 1996 0.24
Poland (2) 1993 0.23
Poland 1989 0.23
Latvia (2) 1995 0.23
Georgia (2) 1996 0.22
















Note:  Numbers in parentheses next to the countries indicate the order of
enactment of the banking laws, if not the first one since 1989.
III. The relationship between RS and Growth
Part 1 of this section describes the data, its coverage and sources, and the method of
the empirical analysis.  Part 2 reports the main results of the estimation.  Part 3 provides a
close look into the individual components of RS.
                                                                                                                                                        
12 The number of principle components are selected on the basis of eigen-values drawn from a
procedure that maximizes the data variance.11
III.1.  Data and the Estimation Method
The sample of the current study comprises 23 transition economies that are the
formerly centrally planned central and east European countries and countries that broke off
from the former Soviet Union (FSU).
13  Since the beginning of reforms at the end of the
1980s, eight of these countries have adopted two banking laws (or amended their banking
laws twice) and one of them (Poland) has adopted three banking laws (or amended its banking
laws three times).
In view of the wide ranging reforms that almost all transition economies have
undergone since the beginning of the 1990s, this study also takes into account a measure of
degree of liberalization, an index called CLI
14, which is developed by De Melo et al (1996).
It may be argued that countries that have better economic conditions at the start of the reforms
also have the political capacity to reform and establish better institutions.  Hence, such an
initial effect may be the cause of both better institutions and better post-reform economic
performance.  In assessing the role of RS on growth, the current empirical analysis, therefore,
also controls for levels of GDP per capita (in logarithms) at the year of the enactment of
banking laws (InitGDPpc), as a measure of initial conditions.
The time coverage for the empirical analysis is chosen to be the period following the
enactment year of the last banking law.  In case a country has enacted two banking laws, the
first period for that country begins with the year following the enactment year of the first
banking law until, and including, the year of enactment of the next law; and the second period
                                                
13 The sample excludes Romania, Bosnia, contemporary Yugoslavia and Turkmenistan due to data
deficiencies.
14 CLI stands for "Cumulative Liberalization Index", which is a combined index of internal and
external price liberalization and other market reforms including privatization that is reported
cumulatively over time.12
for that country covers the period after the year of enactment of the second banking law
until 1998, which is the last year of the available data.
Since 1989, there have been more than one enactment of banking laws in nine
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and
Uzbekistan) of the sample countries.  By the construct of time periods described above, this
leads to a panel data of 32 observations.  Appendix table A3 reports the country list, the years
of enactment of the banking laws and the time coverage for each country-observation.  Data
on real growth rates are used in averages over the periods identified for each country -
observation.  As CLI is measured cumulatively over the years, however, we take the value of
CLI that corresponds to the median year of the period under consideration.  Table 2 reports
the sample correlations among the control variables used in the following empirical analysis.
Table 2: Correlations between the control variables:
_______________________________________________
Rsu  CLI Corr InitGDP
Rsu    1
CLI   0.59    1
Corr   0.40    0.28         1
InitGDP                         0.51      0.63     0.63        1    _____
In the regressions below, we estimate real growth using ordinary least squares with
heteroskedasticity-corrected error terms.
15  Appendix Table A4.b reports the panel data used
in the empirical analysis.  The source for growth and GDP data is the Transition Report
Update, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999.
                                                
15  The current data set is not suitable for using either random effects or fixed effects
models since many of the countries in the sample have only one observation over time.  In
case of either random or fixed effects formulations, this attribute of the data would therefore
lead to biases in the estimated parameters.13
III.2.  Empirical Evidence
In this part, we empirically investigate the relationship between RS and real GDP
growth.  We hypothesise that, not only as an institutional element but also as an indicator of
the political will to reform the economy, RS has effects on the growth performance.
Table 3:  Dependent Variable: Real growth rate of GDP
Explanatory variables:             I                       II                          III                 
C          -7.85***              -1.10   -0.72
          (-4.11)      (-1.22)   (-0.87)
RSu          34.6***
          (4.46)








PCb1   2.26***         
  (2.56)
PCb2   2.53***       
  (2.76)
PCb3   2.54***
  (3.30)
R-bar square: 0.32             0.27       0.34
Degrees of freedom:    30                27      28
___________________________________________________________
Note:   Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; *** indicates significance at 1% level, **
indicates significance at 5% level.
Table 3 reports the regression of real growth on alternative measures of RS, namely
RSu, PCa (4 principle components) and PCb (3 principle components) described in section II.
According to the table, all types of aggregate measures of RS appear to have significant
positive relationship with growth.  While RSu yields higher significance than any single
principle component, all principle components, except for the first one of the first method
(Pca1) are also significant.  With regards to the goodness of fit, there is no major difference14
among the alternative measures of RS in explaining growth.  Hence, we use only RSu in the
remainder of the empirical analysis in order to gain degrees of freedom.
Table 4 reports the results of robustness analysis, where we investigate the
performance of RS after including other variables that may also affect growth. The variables
we add consecutively into the regressions are CLI, Corr, InitGDPpc and MultRS. Corr stands
for the Corruption Perception Index, higher values of which indicating greater rule of law.
16
The reason for including this variable is to isolate the effect of RS, which is merely based on
banking laws, after controlling for the effect of rule of law on growth.
17  MultRS is an
interactive term between RS and a dummy variable that takes the value of one for
observations corresponding to the cases of more than one banking law enactment, and zero
otherwise. The reason for including this interactive term is as follows. Many transition
economies adopted banking laws early in the process of their wide-ranging reform attempts.
While these laws were possibly modelled after developed country laws, they may, at least
initially, not reflect the actual quality of RS that transition economies were politically capable
of supporting.  Hence, we hypothesise that the revised banking laws would better reflect the
actual capacity, or will, of these countries to reform their legal frameworks than the earlier
ones.  It is worth noting that seven out of nine countries that have more than one banking law
enactment
18 have revised banking laws in either 1995 or 1996.  This may also be the result of
                                                
16 The index is published by Transparency International and available on the internet site
"http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html" for the year 1999.
17 We try the same runs with the alternative index of the Rule of Law as in Pistor et al (2000).  We do
not report those results here since they are virtually the same as those obtained by the Corruption
Perception Index.
18 The complete list of the countries that have enacted more than one banking law since 1989 are
Armenia (1996), Azerbaijan (1996), Croatia (1996) Georgia (1996), Kazakhstan (1995), Latvia
(1995), Poland (1993), Slovakia (1996) and Uzbekstan (1994).15
the global recognition of the increasing importance of good regulatory and supervisory
frameworks.
Table 4:  Dependent Variable: Real GDP growth
Explanatory variables:         I                   II                  III___              IV_____
Constant      -9.39***        -11.01***      -17.07** -15.17**
     (-3.85)      (-3.16)           (-2.30)  (-2.24)
      
RSu       24.79***     20.35**        20.25** 9.4
      (3.44)      (2.31)          (2.26)  (1.22)
CLI        1.01*     0.89  0.52 0.71
       (1.74)             (1.60) (0.71) (1.33)
Corr      0.98 0.43 2.07**
    (1.11) (0.42) (2.07)
InitGDPpc 1.33 0.23           
   (1.00) (0.18)
MultRS          28.9 ***
(3.73)
R-bar square:         0.35                0.31                 0.30                  0.51
Degrees of freedom:        29      27                 24                     23
______________________________________________________________
(Note: numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates
significance at 5% level, * indicates significance at 10% level.)
In column 1 of Table 4, we observe that although the addition of CLI into the
regression slightly improves the goodness of fit as compared to the first column of Table 3,
CLI itself is significant only at 10% level of confidence.  Columns II and III show that neither
rule of law (Corr) nor initial level of GDP (InitGDP) are significant; furthermore, they reduce
the goodness of fit of the regression as compared to column 1 of Table 3 or Table 4.   In
addition, the positive effect of CLI on real growth observed in column 1 disappears in
regressions II and III, due possibly to the multicollinearity problem that can be observed in
Table 2.  In column IV, however, we observe that the inclusion of MultRS improves the
adjusted R-square of the regression to 51%.  Though RSu loses its significance in this run,16
MultRS term is significant at 1% level that supports the above argument justifying its
inclusion.  In this regression, Corr also appears significant at 5% level.  In a separate
regression (not reported) that employs only the constant term, RSu, CLI and MultRS as the
right hand side variables, however, we observe that the coefficients of RSu and MultRS are
both significantly positive, at 1% level.  Hence, we conclude that, keeping other things
constant, higher quality of bank regulation and supervision is associated with higher degrees
of real growth and revised banking laws reinforce these results.
III.3. A Closer Look Into the Components of RS
We next separately investigate the effects of each of the eight main components of
RSu on growth.  To do this, we run OLS regressions with robust errors as above(not
reported).  It is not appropriate to run a regression with all the eight components since many
of the eight categories, marked A to H in Appendix 1, are highly correlated with each other.
Those components of RS that exhibit at least 50% correlation are A and D, A and G, C and D,
C and E, C and G, D and E, D and G, E and G, and F and G.  Among these, E (reporting and
recording requirements) is correlated with both C (ownership structure) and D (directors and
managers) by more than 70%.
We next look at the composition of the principle components, both of type PCa and
PCb.  A close inspection of Appendix 2 reveals that the first principle component of type PCa
attaches greater weights to some components of A, B, C, D, E and G that intend to measure
the quality of RS with respect to, in that order, capital requirements, lending, ownership
structure, directors and managers, reporting recording and supervision.  More specifically,
composition of the first principle component relies heavily on the explicit definition of liable
capital, presence of a system to evaluate borrower creditworthiness, credit exposure, the
nature of participating agents in the decision of lending to managers and big borrowers,
presence of dual control, and the auditing and supervisory standards.  Different emphases,17
however, are observed in the second, third and the forth components of type PCa, as well as
in the components of type PCb.  The first principle component of type PCb gives higher
weights to capital adequacy (category A), lending (category B), directors and managers
(category D) and reporting recording requirements (category E).
It is also interesting to note in both Table A2.a and A2.b that the various components
of deposit insurance take either a negligible part or enter with a negative sign in the
composition of the first principle components of both type PCa and type PCb.  This may
indicate that the existence of deposit insurance does not bode well with the rest of the criteria
designed to measure the quality of RS.
IV.  Concluding Remarks
This article develops a general framework to measure the quality of bank regulation
and supervision (RS) based on the evaluation of banking laws.  Using a total of ninety-eight
criteria, we form aggregate measures of RS, both by simply averaging the indices for the eight
main aspects of RS and by principle components analysis.
Using panel data on 23 transition economies, we then perform OLS estimation of real
GDP growth with heteroskedasticity-corrected error terms.  The empirical analysis presents
evidence that the higher the quality of RS, the higher is the real growth rate.  The effect of RS
on growth remains after controlling for the degree of liberalization (CLI).  Other things being
constant, the effects of RSu on growth are much more pronounced in cases of more than one
banking law enactments since the reforms have started in the early 1990s.  In most transition
economies, these revisions of banking law took place later than 1994.  This may indicate that,
keeping other factors constant, revised versions of banking laws better reflect the economic
and political realities of transition economies than the early adopted versions of banking laws
that were possibly of the nature "one size fits all".18
The current study thus provides suggestive evidence that, given the level of market
liberalization and the degree of central bank independence in transition economies, an
increase in the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) is significantly associated with
an increase in the growth rate.  Hence, this study provides empirical support for strengthening
bank regulation and supervision that emerged as the main policy proposal in the aftermath of
the recent financial and economic crises.19
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APPENDIX 1. LIST OF CRITERIA FOR MEASURING THE QUALITY OF 
BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
(Note: Under each criterion, the ranking of (1) indicates the highest quality, while higher
numbers indicate lower quality)
A. Capital Requirements
1. Minimum capital at licensing
  a. Minimum capital
    (1) nominal amount
    (2) determined by supervisor
    (3) no comment
2. Capital adequacy
  a. Maximum liability ratio (risky assets / liable capital) of a bank should be
    (1) 5 % of liable capital
    (2) 10% of liable capital
    (3) over 10 % of liable capital not mentioned
   b. Is liable capital explicitly defined?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  c. Is there any extra capital required to cover losses?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
3.Major acquisitions and investments
  a. Maximum aggregate amount of investment
    (1) 20 % of  its own funds
    (2) 40 % of  its own funds
    (3) 60 % of  its own funds
    (4) 80 % of  its own funds
    (5) no restriction
  b. Instead of repayment of a loan, a juridical person's capital may be owned for
    (1) more than 3 years
    (2) 2 years
    (3) 1 year
    (4) no comment
  c. Maximum amount of capital of any juridical person a bank may participate is
    (1) 5 % of its own funds
    (2) 10% of its own funds22
    (3) 20% of its own funds
    (4) no comment
  d. Maximum aggregate amount of investment on juridical persons
    (1) 20 % of liable capital
    (2) 40 % of liable capital
    (3) 60 % of liable capital
    (4) 80 % of liable capital
    (5) no comment or higher
B. Lending
1. Lending to Private Sector
  a. May supervisors prohibit emergency loans?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  b. Maximum total amount of certain positions of a bank involving price risks at close of
business any day
    (1) 10 % of liable capital
    (2) 20 % of liable capital
    (3) 30 % of liable capital
    (4) 50 % of liable capital
    (5) more than 50 % of liable capital or not mentioned
c. Maximum total amount of certain positions of a bank involving exchange rate risks at close
of business any day
    (1) 10 % of liable capital
    (2) 20 % of liable capital
    (3) 30 % of liable capital
    (4) 50 % of liable capital
    (5) more than 50 % of liable capital or not mentioned
d. Maximum total amount of certain positions of a bank involving interest risks at close of
business any day
    (1) 10 % of liable capital
    (2) 20 % of liable capital
    (3) 30 % of liable capital
    (4) 50 % of liable capital
    (5) more than 50 % of liable capital or not mentioned
  e.  Is there a defined system to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  f. Does a bank investigate balance sheet of the borrower to evaluate the financial standing?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned23
  g. Maximum aggregate credit for one borrower
    (1) 25 % of liable capital
    (2) 50 % of liable capital
    (3) 75 % of liable capital
    (4) over 75 % or not mentioned
  h. Maximum aggregate credit for one related party
    (1) 25 % of liable capital
    (2) 50 % of liable capital
    (3) 75 % of liable capital
    (4) over 75 % or not mentioned
i. Maximum aggregate credit for one single sector
    (1) 25 % of liable capital
    (2) 50 % of liable capital
    (3) 75 % of liable capital
    (4) over 75 % or not mentioned
 j. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to borrowers
    (1) 10 times capital
    (2) 20 times capital
    (3) 30 times capital
    (4) over 30 times of capital or not mentioned
  k. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to related parties
    (1) 1 times capital
    (2) 2 times capital
    (3) 3 times capital
    (4) over 3 times capital or not mentioned
  l. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to 10 big borrowers (large exposures)
    (1) 5 times capital
    (2) 10 times capital
    (3) 15 times capital
    (4) over 15 times of capital or not mentioned
  m. Maximum aggregate credit to a single employee
    (1) 100 % of employee's salary
    (2) 200 % of employee's salary
    (3) up to 5 % of liable capital
    (4) up to 10 % of liable capital
    (5) more or unlimited
  n. Maximum aggregate credit to managers
    (1) not allowed
    (2) 10 % of liable capital
    (3) 20 % of liable capital24
    (4) 30 % of liable capital
    (5) over 30 % of liable capital or not mentioned
o. Who participates in the decision of lending to 10 big borrowers (large exposures)?
    (1) unanimous votes and supervisor's consent
    (2) majority votes
    (3) unanimous votes
    (4) none of the above
p. Who participates in the decision of lending to managers?
    (1) unanimous votes and supervisor's consent
    (2) majority votes
    (3) unanimous votes
    (4) none of the above
r. Rules for calculating guarantees for loans
    (1) given
    (2) not given
s. Is credit to shareholders allowed?
    (1) no
    (2) yes
2. Lending to the Government
  a. May banks carry out operations with budget funds on the basis of concluded contracts,
carry out money transfers with the organs of executive power and municipal organs, provide
for aimful use of budget funds allocated for the purpose of carrying out state and regional
programs?
    (1) no
    (2) yes
  b. Extending credit to government and local government to finance budget deficits allowed
or not?
    (1) no
    (2) yes
C. Ownership structure
1.Restrictions on shareholders
  a. Financial standing for shareholders wanted for
    (1) over 5 years
    (2) greater or equal to 3 years less than 5 years
    (3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 3 years
    (4) no comment
  b. Financial standing of shareholders asked owning
    (1) over 1% of total shares25
    (2) over 5% of total shares
    (3) over 10% of total shares
    (4) no comment
  c. Maximum share one may own
    (1) 10 % of total shares
    (2) 25 % of total shares
    (3) 50 % of total shares
    (4) 75 % of total shares
    (5) more than 75 % of total shares or not mentioned
  d. Source of the capital
    (1) should be proved
    (2) no comment
  e. Who are restricted from being shareholders?
    (1) political parties, social funds, media
    (2) one or two of (1)
    (3) not restricted
  f. Does the law prohibit selection of shareholders that are associated bank failures as a
director or manager or a shareholder in the past?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
2. Transfer of shareholders
  a. When how much shares transferred supervisor should be notified?
    (1) less than 5 %
    (2) greater or equal to 5 % less than 10 %
    (3) greater or equal to 10 % less than 25 %
    (4) greater or equal to 25 % less than 50 %
    (5) over 50 % or No comment
  b. When a shareholder dies, may supervisor prohibit business?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  c. While increasing or decreasing shares when how much capital reached it should be
reported?
    (1) less than 10 %
    (2) greater or equal to 10 % less than 25 %
    (3) greater or equal to 25 % less than 50 %
    (4) greater or equal to 50 % less than 75 %
    (5) no comment26
D. Directors and Managers
 a. Is there a rule of dual control
(19)?
    (1) Yes
    (2) No
  b. How much experience needed for top managers?
    (1) More than 5 years
    (2) greater or equal to 3 years less than 5 years
    (3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 3 years
    (4) no clause
  c. How much experience needed for other managers (other than top managers)?
    (1) more than 5 years
    (2) greater or equal to 3 years less than 5 years
    (3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 3 years
    (4) no clause
  d. Does the law prohibit selection of directors or managers who are associated bank failures
as a director or manager in the past?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  e. Are the overseas managers also subject to c and d?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
E. Reporting / Recording
1. Operating Plan Systems of Control and Internal Organisation
  a. Are qualifications about independent auditors asked in law?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  b. Is information about systems of control and internal organisations spelled out in the law?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  c. Does the law require information about qualifications of managers of the board?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  d. Are the duties of the managers of the board defined explicitly in the law?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
                                                
19 Decisions should be taken by at least two managers.27
2. Financial Projection
  a. Projected balance sheet for
    (1) over 3 years
    (2) 2 years
    (3) 1 year
    (4) no comment
3. Cross Border Banking
  a. Is approval from home country required when the proposed owner is a foreign bank?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
4. On-site supervision
  a. Do on-site checks exist?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  b. Who does on-site checks?
    (1) supervisor's employees
    (2) auditors
    (3) other or not mentioned
  c. Frequency of audits
    (1) monthly or more often
    (2) quarterly
    (3) yearly
    (4) not mentioned
  d. Is there a detailed scope for auditing report?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  e. Do auditors inform supervisors about irregularities and deficiencies?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  f. Does the law require background check for auditors?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  g. Do the auditing reports obey the accounting standards set by the reports?
    (1) yes
    (2) no28
5. Coverage of Reporting and Recording
  a. Is there a requirement for reporting annual balance sheets?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  b. Frequency of bank reports
    (1) monthly
    (2) quarterly
    (3) semiannually
    (4) annually
    (5) not mentioned
  c. Is there any report on liquidity creditworthiness and profitability of the bank?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  d. Does the bank notify the supervisor when there is a change in the charter?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  e. Is there a detailed scope for supervision reports?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  f. Are bank reports required to have a statement on risk management policies and
procedures?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
g. Does the bank report to supervisors its deposit sources?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
F. Corrective Action
  a. Are the cases causing conservatorship defined clearly?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
  b. Are the cases causing liquidation trustee defined clearly?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
  c. Central Bank provides credit29
    (1) under very restrictive conditions
    (2) under looser conditions
    (3) no restrictions
  d. Limit of loss causing loss of license
    (1) less than 1/3 of liable capital
    (2) greater or equal to 1/3 of liable capital less than 2/3 of liable capital
    (3) greater or equal to 2/3 of liable capital
e. May the supervisor impose penalties on individual managers of the bank?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
f. May the supervisor constrain the business activities of the bank?
    (1) yes
    (2) no
G. Supervision
a. Are supervisor reports published?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
b. Are the roles of the supervisor clearly defined?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
c. Does the supervisor have a say over the licensing? (if supervisor and the regulatory agent
are the same then the answer will be kept as NA)
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
d. When supervisory and regulatory agents are different, is there a close coordination between
them? (if supervisor and the regulatory agent are the same then the answer will be kept as
NA)
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
e. Is the amount of investment and acquisitions that needs supervisor's approval is clearly
defined?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
f. Does the supervisory agent have a full access to lending and investment information ?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned30
g. Does the supervisor have a legal authority to require changes in bank management and
the board?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
h. Does the supervisor hold regular meetings of the bank's senior and middle management?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
i. Does the supervisor have the authority to monitor the quality of work done by external
auditors
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
j. Does the supervisor have a say on the appointment (and dismissal) of external auditors
based on the expertise and independence (or the lack of it)
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
k. Authority to supervise the overseas activities of local banks?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
l. Does the supervisor visit offshore locations-periodically?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
m. Does the supervisor have the authority to close the overseas offices or to impose
limitations on their activities?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
n. Does the supervisor set fixed percentages for exposures to each country?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
o. In case of corporate ownership of banks,  does the supervisor have the authority to review
the activities of parent companies and of companies affiliated with the parent companies
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
p. In case of corporate ownership of banks, does the supervisor have the authority to take
remedial actions regarding parent companies and non-bank affiliates?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
q. In case of corporate ownership of banks, does the supervisor have the authority to establish
and enforce fit and proper standards for owners and senior management of parent companies?
    (1) yes31
    (2) no or not mentioned
r. Is there a system of cooperation and information sharing with foreign agencies that have
supervisory responsibilities for banking operations of material interest to the domestic
supervisor?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
H. Deposit Insurance
a. Is deposit insurance (DI) coverage explicitly determined?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
b. Is there a coinsurance (by depositors, in the form of deductables on earnings)?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
c. Are foreign currency deposits covered?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
d. Are interbank deposits covered?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
e. Is DI funded (by the covered banks via premiums) ?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
f. Funded schemes are based on:
    (1) Paid-up resources
    (2) Callable
g. Sources of funds:
    (1) Banks only
    (2) Banks and Government
    (3) Government
h. Is membership compulsory?
    (1) yes
    (2) no (-on a voluntary basis)
i. DI is managed:
    (1) Privately
    (2) Jointly by banks and government
    (3) by the government
j. Is there a close cooperation between the management of DI and the Central Bank?32
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
k.  Is there a close cooperation with the bank supervisor ?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
l.  Are the payments (to depositors) prompt (within 30 days) ?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned
m.  Is there full coverage during crises?
    (1) yes
    (2) no or not mentioned33
APPENDIX 2:  Principle Components
Table A2.a: Composition of Pa1, Pa2, Pa3 and Pa4:
Criteria : Components: Criteria : Components:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
A1A 0.57 0.15 0.02 0.15 E4C 0.38 0.29 0.05 -0.04
A2A 0.66 0.35 0.18 0.10 E4D 0.06 0.34 0.28 0.01
A2B 0.85 -0.02 0.08 0.01 E4E 0.56 0.57 0.06 0.20
A2C 0.27 -0.06 0.36 0.02 E4F 0.15 0.19 0.48 -0.22
A3A 0.58 -0.23 -0.21 0.00 E4G 0.61 0.20 0.35 0.24
A3B 0.47 0.27 0.16 -0.08 E5A -0.40 0.42 0.25 0.38
A3C 0.06 0.16 0.63 0.24 E5B 0.27 -0.10 0.44 -0.10
A3D -0.16 0.47 0.36 0.12 E5C -0.19 -0.06 0.46 -0.19
B1C 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.24 E5D -0.09 0.17 0.68 -0.02
B1E 0.57 -0.26 0.00 0.09 E5E -0.09 0.17 0.68 -0.02
B1F 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.19 E5F 0.18 0.25 0.47 -0.11
B1G 0.65 0.45 0.03 0.26 E5G -0.18 -0.13 0.44 0.20
B1H 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.24 F1A -0.10 0.54 0.14 0.03
B1K 0.02 -0.20 0.40 0.11 F1B -0.14 0.69 0.07 0.23
B1L 0.86 0.18 -0.06 0.06 F1D -0.06 0.65 -0.33 -0.13
B1M 0.09 0.33 0.30 -0.16 F1E 0.44 0.64 0.04 0.08
B1N 0.37 0.30 0.59 0.05 F1F 0.07 0.68 0.17 0.03
B1O 0.73 -0.06 -0.19 0.23 G1A -0.15 0.11 0.09 0.14
B1P 0.86 -0.14 -0.01 0.07 G1B 0.25 0.12 0.34 0.57
B1R 0.16 0.25 0.58 -0.13 G1E 0.27 0.74 0.08 -0.02
B2A -0.14 -0.09 -0.08 -0.34 G1F 0.19 0.83 0.06 -0.01
B2B -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.47 G1G 0.13 0.75 0.24 0.15
C1A -0.09 0.20 0.51 0.24 G1H 0.32 0.20 0.50 -0.33
C1B -0.06 -0.04 0.57 0.26 G1I 0.69 0.20 0.33 -0.03
C1C 0.10 -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 G1J 0.69 0.20 0.33 -0.03
C1D 0.58 -0.26 -0.16 0.05 G1K 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.14
C1E -0.31 -0.50 0.02 -0.21 G1L 0.30 0.22 -0.06 0.25
C1F -0.01 0.33 0.13 -0.09 G1M 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.01
C2A 0.15 0.34 0.44 -0.40 G1O -0.18 -0.18 0.40 0.08
C2C 0.07 0.47 0.24 0.28 G1R 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.34
D1A 0.81 -0.19 0.20 -0.09 H1A 0.04 0.48 -0.35 -0.13
D1B 0.29 0.13 0.54 0.12 H1C 0.04 0.48 -0.35 -0.13
D1C -0.03 0.11 0.57 0.20 H1E -0.08 0.35 -0.31 -0.62
D1D -0.05 0.08 0.74 0.23 H1F -0.05 0.46 -0.29 -0.63
E1A 0.10 0.22 0.36 0.05 H1G -0.08 0.02 -0.25 -0.77
E1B 0.00 0.62 0.37 0.37 H1H 0.37 -0.03 -0.20 -0.70
E1C -0.02 0.37 0.56 0.08 H1I 0.39 -0.39 -0.12 0.06
E1D -0.02 0.64 0.36 0.25 H1J 0.06 0.06 0.15 -0.83
E2A 0.20 0.22 -0.14 0.55 H1K 0.06 0.06 0.15 -0.83
E3A 0.26 -0.27 0.39 0.03 H1L -0.02 0.32 -0.12 -0.45
E4A -0.05 0.34 0.44 0.39 H1N 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.37
E4B -0.02 0.44 0.39 0.37
Notes: 1. Principle components are obtained with Varimax method.
2. Codification of criteria follow Appendix 1.  Those criteria that have no
variation across observations have been eliminated, resulting in 83 variables reported
above.34
Table A2.b: Composition of Pb1, Pb2 and Pb3 -- first step
3
Criteria: Component Criteria: Component
1 2 3 1 2
A1A 0.81 -0.24 0.12 E4C 0.41 -0.10
A2A 0.90 0.15 -1.30 E4D 0.56 -0.10
A2B 0.64 -0.10 0.40 E4E 0.54 -0.52
A2C 0.23 0.52 0.54 E4F 0.59 0.25
A3A 0.05 -0.12 0.86 E4G 0.60 -0.29
A3B 0.68 0.34 -1.20 E5A 0.39 0.15
A3C 0.02 0.91 8.41 E5B 0.30 0.41
A3D -0.04 0.69 -0.36 E5C 0.09 0.20
B1C 0.02 0.97 -0.09 E5D 0.62 0.64
B1E 0.57 0.03 0.27 E5E 0.62 0.64
B1F 0.05 0.72 0.35 E5F 0.57 -0.12
B1G 0.65 0.33 0.39 E5G 0.17 0.38
B1H 0.02 0.97 -0.09 F1A 0.29
B1K 0.10 0.05 0.43 F1B 0.29
B1L 0.85 0.21 0.22 F1D 0.29
B1M -0.10 -0.08 0.77 F1E 0.27
B1N 0.23 -0.08 0.84 F1F 0.28
B1O 0.80 -0.13 -0.13 G1A -0.28 0.36
B1P 0.90 -0.10 -0.01 G1B 0.39 0.18
B1R -0.06 0.02 0.64 G1E 0.21 0.82
B2A -0.18 -0.08 -0.27 G1F 0.29 0.76
B2B -0.13 -0.06 -0.24 G1G 0.26 0.79
C1A -0.30 0.85 0.01 G1H 0.22 0.49
C1B 0.01 0.90 -0.04 G1I 0.75 0.27
C1C 0.86 -0.04 0.27 G1J 0.75 0.27
C1D 0.26 -0.08 0.04 G1K 0.65 0.37
C1E 0.62 0.06 -0.45 G1L 0.73 0.00
C1F -0.07 0.14 0.72 G1M 0.71 0.47
C2A 0.14 -0.21 0.74 G1O 0.00 -0.21
C2C -0.62 0.22 0.37 G1R 0.76 -0.13
D1A 0.10 H1A 0.06 0.96
D1B 0.42 H1C 0.06 0.96
D1C 0.39 H1E 0.67 0.57
D1D 0.39 H1F 0.68 0.61
E1A 0.46 -0.16 H1G 0.89 0.10
E1B 0.81 -0.09 H1H 0.72 0.14
E1C 0.75 0.16 H1I 0.08 -0.18
E1D 0.75 -0.02 H1J 0.89 -0.22
E2A 0.23 -0.69 H1K 0.89 -0.22
E3A 0.08 0.00 H1L 0.57 0.03
E4A 0.62 -0.28 H1N 0.43 0.00
E4B 0.66 -0.31
Notes: 1. Principle components are obtained with Varimax method.
2. Codification for criteria follow Appendix 1.
3. Separate principle component analysis is performed for each of the eight main
components.  This leads to 17 principle components (number of components added up for
each category from A to H) that are then subjected to a second round of analysis reported
below.35
Table A2.b: Composition of Pb1, Pb2 and Pb3 -- Continued:
Principle Components Components:
of 8 Main Categories: 1 2 3
A1 0.11 0.51 0.55
A2 0.67 0.16 0.04
A3 -0.06 -0.34 0.65
B1 -0.13 0.13 0.91
B2 -0.12 0.22 0.10
B3 0.69 0.33 -0.01
C1 0.04 -0.39 -0.12
C2 0.76 -0.06 -0.03
C3 0.23 0.65 -0.03
D 0.84 0.06 0.22
E1 0.40 0.62 0.38
E2 0.65 -0.03 -0.39
F 0.16 0.84 -0.07
G1 0.33 0.13 0.65
G2 0.21 0.83 -0.09
H1 -0.28 0.12 -0.19
H2 -0.22 0.48 -0.14
Note:  Based on Eigen values, 3 principle components
for criteria A, B and C, 2 principle components for criteria
E, G, and H and 1 principle component for criteria D and
F are used, as reported above.36
APPENDIX 3: Time Coverage for country-observation:
Sample Enactment year of
Country Observation Period The Banking-Law
Albenia 1 97-98 96
Armenia 1 93-96 92
2 97-98 96
Azarbaijan 1 93-96 92
2 97-98 96
Belarus 1 93-98 92
Bulgaria 1 93-98 92
Croatia 1 94-96 93
2 97-98 96
Czeck 1 93-98 92
Estonia 1 95-98 94
Georgia 1 92-96 91
2 97-98 96
Hungary 1 95-98 94
Kazakhistan 1 94-95 93
2 96-98 95
Krgyzistan 1 92-98 91
Latvia 1 93-95 92
2 96-98 95
Lithuania 1 93-98 92
Macedonia 1 95-98 94




Russia 1 97-98 96
Slovakia 1 93-96 92
2 97-98 96
Slovenia 1 93-98 92
Tajikistan 1 92-98 91
Ukraine 1 94-98 93
Uzbekistan 1 92-98 91
Note: 1. The starting year of the sample periods are selected as the year following the
latest of the enactment years of banking laws until the enactment of the next law or 1998,
which is taken as the end of the period.
2.  The third observation on Poland is not in the current sample due to lack of data on
other panel variables, such as CLI.
3.  Due to lack of data, the period used in the empirical analysis actually starts with 1991.37
APPENDIX 4: Panel Data
Table A4.a: Alternative measures of RS.
Country Period RSu PCa1 PCa2 PCa3 PCa4 PCb1 PCb2 PCb3
Albenia 1 0.34 -0.34 0.81 0.83 0.93 0.91 0.56 0.38
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Armenia 1 0.06 -0.50 -0.89 -0.34 0.08 -0.28 -1.10 -0.30
2 0.26 -0.83 0.60 0.50 0.79 0.35 0.84 -0.95
Azarbaijan 1 0.07 -0.59 -0.94 -0.41 0.15 -0.44 -0.98 -0.56
2 0.24 -1.02 -0.98 2.22 0.45 2.35 -1.37 -0.54
Belarus 1 0.12 -0.57 -0.52 -0.55 -0.03 -0.75 -0.56 -0.22
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Bulgaria 1 0.25 1.20 -0.58 0.86 0.40 1.11 0.09 0.83
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Croatia 1 0.25 2.41 -1.09 -0.72 0.21 -0.60 -0.64 2.33
2 0.26 3.21 -1 -0.87 0.29 -0.75 -0.44 2.52
Czheck Republic 1 0.26 -0.13 1.76 -0.64 -2.48 -0.78 1.51 -1.21
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Estonia 1 0.42 0.43 1.19 2.19 0.51 2.90 0.83 0.19
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Georgia 1 0.12 -0.48 -0.60 -0.61 -0.74 -0.68 -0.60 -0.77
2 0.22 -0.57 0.34 0.91 0.09 0.62 0.18 -0.49
Hungary 1 0.48 2 1.10 2.81 -1.81 1.37 1.98 0.50
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Kazakhstan 1 0.16 -0.56 -0.54 -0.34 0.69 -0.40 -0.18 -0.28
2 0.33 -0.28 -0.01 1.02 1.25 1.80 -0.64 0.55
Krgyzystan 1 0.20 -0.51 -0.15 -0.08 -2.61 -0.86 -0.35 -0.69
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Latvia 1 0.03 -0.61 -0.44 -0.57 0.27 -0.59 -0.68 -0.10
2 0.23 0.30 0.41 -0.29 1.35 -0.81 1.05 0.83
Lithuania 1 0.20 -0.70 0.03 0.45 0.07 0.68 0.03 -0.72
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Macedonia 1 0.30 0.21 2.67 -1.96 -0.75 -1.20 2.71 -0.53
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Moldovia 1 0.04 -0.70 -0.97 -0.26 -0.01 -0.34 -1.03 -0.76
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Poland 1 0.23 -0.46 1.43 -1.02 1.05 -0.69 1.31 -0.51
2 0.23 -0.45 1.42 -1.02 1.05 -0.63 1.28 -0.54
Russia 1 0.09 -0.52 -0.72 -0.03 0.18 0.10 -0.91 -0.31
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Slovakia 1 0.26 -0.13 1.76 -0.64 -2.48 -0.78 1.51 -1.21
2 0.20 -0.25 0.69 0.42 -0.21 0.85 0.44 -0.73
Slovenia 1 0.14 1.05 -0.24 -0.61 -0.27 -0.49 -0.64 1.59
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Tajikistan 1 0.07 -0.45 -0.70 -0.73 0.09 -0.74 -0.51 -0.55
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Ukraine 1 0.11 -0.67 -0.64 -0.04 -0.06 0.13 -0.92 -0.77
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Uzbekistan 1 0.14 -0.26 -0.99 -0.15 -1.41 -0.52 -0.95 -0.46
2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Notes:  1. RSu is unweighted averages of the eight main components of RS.
2. PCa (1 to 4) and PCb (1 to 3) are two types of principle components.  See
Appendix 2 and see p.9 for detail.38
Table A4.b: Data Used in the Estimation
Country Periods Real GDP CLI Initial GDP Corr
Growth per capita
Albenia 1 -- 4,56 799 2,30
2 0,83 -- -- --
Armenia 1 5,15 1,69 125 2,50
2 -13,33 3,37 426 2,50
Azarbaijan 1 7,95 1,25 364 1,70
2 -1,57 2,64 423 1,70
Belarus 1 -- 1,79 401 3,40
2 -2,15 -- -- --
Bulgaria 1 -- 3,81 1012 3,30
2 6,23 -- -- --
Croatia 1 4,50 4,83 2342 2,70
2 2,07 6,53 4392 2,70
Czheck  Republic 1 -- 5,04 2906 4,60
2 5,93 -- -- --
Estonia 1 -- 5,26 1530 5,70
2 -13,74 -- -- --
Georgia 1 6,95 1,36 213,7 2,30
2 3,05 3,26 782,3 2,30
Hungary 1 -- 6,38 4052 5,20
2 -10,40 -- -- --
Kazakhstan 1 0,00 1,62 916 2,30
2 -5,87 3,39 1008 2,30
Krgyzystan 1 -- 2,63 -- 2,20
2 -5,03 -- -- --
Latvia 1 4,60 2,45 578 3,40
2 -1,32 5,00 1780 3,40
Lithuania 1 -- 4,06 514 3,80
2 -3,99 5,39 2127 3,80
Macedonia 1 -- 5,93 1500 3,30
2 -11,40 -- -- --
Moldovia 1 -5,10 2,30 231,7 2,60
2 -- 3,80 386,4 2,60
Poland 1 6,30 2,46 2037 4,20
2 -1,85 3,36 2234 4,20
Russia 1 -- 6,05 2910 2,40
2 3,68 -- -- --
Slovakia 1 5,45 3,90 2213 3,70
2 3,88 6,05 3495 3,70
Slovenia 1 -- 1,34 6280 6,00
2 -10,01 -- -- --
Tajikistan 1 -- 1,34 1116 --
2 -10,02 -- -- --
Ukraine 1 -- 1,90 629 2,60
2 -1,79 -- -- --
Uzbekistan 1 -- 1,69 -- 1,80
2 2.00 2,83 251 1,80
Notes: 1. Macroeconomic data is obtained from: Transition Update, 1999 of  European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.  CLI is due to de Melo et al (1996) and its update.  CBI is due to
CMN (2000).  Rule is obtained from Transparency International.
2.   The word "initial" refers to the year preceding the sample period. 